Nearly fifteen years after the Council of Europe first called for a pan‐European convention on issues in bioethics to harmonize disparate national regulations, in November 1996 the council's Committee of Ministers approved the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine for formal adoption. The draft convention, released in July 1994, provoked strong public, professional, and governmental debate among European nations, particularly regarding provisions for biomedical research with subjects unable to give informed consent. If ratified, the “bioethics convention” will become the first (...) such document to have binding force internationally. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that bioethics is an interdisciplinary science. Why this is so and what it means is not always clear or agreed upon and, in this author's view, its implications are insufficiently researched. On the basis of involvement in projects which were labelled interdisciplinary, the author reflects upon the method of interdisciplinarity, especially its starting point. It is suggested that interdisciplinarity cannot thrive unless it curbs, from the very start, the inevitable reductions of all monodisciplinary approaches. This effort (...) is called methodical epochè, ideally the temporary suspension of all known methods. Its purpose is to achieve an interdisciplinary way of stating the question. Until then no breakdown of the global question by particular methods of single disciplines ought to be attempted. Realistic variations of this ideal are also discussed. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

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The Nation as Philosophical ProblemThe problem of the nation is well articulated in a speech given in 1985 by then president of the Federal Republic of Germany, R. Von Weiszäcker:I belong to a people, the German people. What are the characteristics which we Germans share as a people? What does it mean to belong to such a people? What does the fact that I am German have to do with my identity as a person? Does this fact place a claim (...) on me? Does it mark me? Does it include responsibilities for me? Does it include obligations to me as a German, obligations which I would otherwise not have to fulfil? It is up to us to give content to the term ‘German,’ a content with which we ourselves and the world would like to live in peace.This is not a psychological comment. It is not about the deep-seated need of people to express feelings of collective identity. The question of the nation here is asked from a normative perspective. That will also be the starting point of this study. (shrink)

In diesem sehr gründlich verfassten Werk werden alle Positionen der Philosophie des Altertums und der Spätantike behandelt und in ihrer Wirkkraft auf die mittelalterliche Philosophie transparent gemacht. Die Darstellung der mittelalterlichen Philosophie mit ihren scholastischen und nichtscholastischen Schulen, sowie den jüdischen und arabischen Nebenströmungen bilden den Höhepunkt, dieses dem Grundsatz der Kontinuität verpflichteten Werkes. Das Fortwirken dieser Philosophie wird bis ins 17. Jahrhundert hinein verfolgt und bietet somit eine umfassende Darstellung der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, die zeigt, dass „die Scholastik am Mangel (...) an Menschen und nicht am Mangel an Ideen verfiel“. (shrink)

Die in diesem Band versammelten Arbeiten des französischen Phänomenologen Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) führen nicht nur auf vorzügliche Weise in dessen Philosophie ein, sie dokumentieren darüber hinaus auch die Entwicklung neu einsetzender Reflexionen in den Jahren nach der Publikation der Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung (1945). Kunsttheoretische, sprachphilosophische und auch soziologische Untersuchungen erschließen dem Leser eine Philosophie, die im Rahmen einer kulturphilosophischen Selbstverständigung das 20. Jahrhundert hinsichtlich seiner großen Themen und seiner radikalen Fragestellungen umgreift. Inhalt: Der Zweifel Cézannes (1945), Das Kino und (...) die neue Psychologie (1947), Das Metaphysische im Menschen (1947), Der Mensch und die Widersetzlichkeit der Dinge (1952), Schrift für die Kandidatur am Collège de France (1951/52), Das mittelbare Sprechen und die Stimmen des Schweigens (1952); Lob der Philosophie (1953), Von Mauss zu Claude Lévi-Strauss (1959), Der Philosoph und sein Schatten (1959), Das Auge und der Geist (1961). (shrink)

During his internship the medical student often feels a basic need for ethical discussion. The department of medical ethics at the University of Nijmegen offers a monthly discussion in single clinical departments. The ethicist is then assisted by staff responsible for guiding the interns. These discussions, based on daily experience, aim at critical evaluation of ways the profession is being exercised. As such they form an essential counterpart to the more theoretical learning in classrooms and seminars during previous years. The (...) method is rather flexible. Either an inventory of problems is made, followed by a selection and discussion of one problem. Or a discussion is initiated by an introduction by either staff or ethicist. The actual programme and its origin, the objectives and some of the problems of such a programme are presented in this article. (shrink)

The problem of the nation is articulated as the philosophical problem of the relation between the political and the non-political in the context of modernity. When the political relevance of traditional non-political bonds is removed, a new cohesion needs to be found between free and equal individuals. Three solutions are possible. The liberal-universalistic solution claims that there is no other source of unity than the political process itself; it finds the ingredients of political loyalty in the common rational agreement upon (...) principles of democracy. The nationalistic solution is an attempt to find those ingredients in particularistic allegiances of a non-political, ethnic-cultural nature. Both solutions, present in the old French-German debate on the nation, as well as in recent debates between liberalism and communitarianism, are criticized. Their revival in recent times is explained by the fact that they both represent an erosion of the political sphere that is characteristic for a post-ideological society. The first neglects the specific determinateness of the political, reducing it to the internationality of the market or to the moralism of rights. The second neglects the political nature of democratic legitimation by founding it on the claim to embody a particular culture or „Volk”. — In a discussion with Sandel, it is agreed that the political dimension needs a determinate form of collective identity and a non-contractual form of foundation. This form should not be situated however in the imaginary givenness of an ethnic-cultural context, but in the common undertaking of the moral task of institutionalizing ideals of liberty. These ideals are not an abstract set of principles, but are necessarily mediated by a particular common heritage or a political culture. Finally it is shown that such interpretation of nation or national citizenship is parallel to recent philosophical endorsement of ideals of civic republicanism or constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

The «law of weak parliaments» states that parliaments with small competences only attract weak candidates, which in turn weakens the parliament even more.Research concerning the Belgian delegates to the European Parliament from 1952 to 1979, confirmed this law, but also qualified it by showing that the downward trend can be crosscut when the parliament gains importance as an institutional platform for a social movement, in this case for the European integration.

In a famous article published in 1900, Cardinal Mercier drew up a philosophical balance sheet of the previous century. While still showing respect for modern developments, he severely criticized anything that strayed too far from the neo-Thomistic horizon. It is very characteristic that the first object of his criticism is De Bonald’s traditionalism. Mercier says that this type of philosophy is so greatly influenced by the impotence of reason that it hurls itself into the arms of faith. But, “an act (...) of faith cannot be the primordial act of human reason. An individual could not believe unless he first saw that it was reasonable to believe.”It is philosophy that must articulate this rationality. Philosophy must then be a real science; it must pursue rational insight into reality. Unfortunately, some do not believe that philosophy is a science. Instead, they think its task lies elsewhere; it must try to speak where science remains silent. In that case, it is no longer part of science, but belongs to the domain of imagination, faith or dreams. Mercier argues that whoever accepts this, supports Comte’s positivistic prejudice that only the observed positive fact can lie at the basis of a rational and scientific discussion.Mercier stands at the end of a century of unlimited optimism. From a military point of view, the century had been calm. The new sciences that had so intrigued Mercier were marking their first big successes. The century’s optimism is recognizable in the 1889 charter establishing the Thomistic Higher Institute of Philosophy, which Mercier served as president: “far from bringing dogmas in danger, scientific insights stimulate a wondrous growth in enlightened insight; for they both come from the same God, origin of both revelation and universe.” Mercier’s tonality lies not far distant from Renan’s L’avenir de la science, where he complains that there are people who choose bon ton, superstition and frivolity above meticulous research, but predicts that their success is ephemeral and that the time of rationality will dawn.The next century, however, took an unexpected turn. Who would have thought in 1900 that history, which had been set so firmly on the track of reason, would derail so terribly? No great philosopher predicted the coming catastrophes. The only warnings came from a few nineteenth-century traditionalist Cassandras who went to extremes in linking modernity and decay: Donoso Cortes, Joseph de Maistre and Louis De Bonald. Who predicted the arrival of enlightenment criticism in intellectual history? Who predicted that we would not see history becoming reasonable, but reason historical? Who could have predicted twentieth-century contextualism and its claim that reason is not the criterion of culture but only one element within culture indebted to an entire sociocultural context? All this can be found in De Bonald’s traditionalism that has proven paradoxically more up-to-date than the naïve trust in rationality found in Mercier and Renan.Yet, De Bonald did not intend to preach a form of irrationalism. His purpose was to accent reason’s dependence, and by extension, humankind’s intellectual solidarity: thought is impossible without language, language does not exist without a listener, there is no listener without education, there is no education without social life. Using this reasoning, De Bonald ultimately wants to prove that reason intrinsically refers to revelation, since in this chain, the first word cannot come from humankind.He supports this with an epistemological argument that contextualizes reason in a way that is almost contemporary: “A person has to think his word before saying it. Therefore, he cannot find without thinking, and cannot think without signs. He is compelled to have recourse to something other than the human.” Leuven’s variant of this traditionalism emphasizes that reason develops only in and through language, thus by being included in a community. By comparison, Mercier’s realistic concept of rationality sounds old-fashioned. It is traditionalism that best fits with the contemporary accent on reason’s historicity and culture-related status.The development of ethics also runs counter to Mercier’s expectations. There has been no growth in rationality but a growing insight into the historicity of reason. In the article already cited, Mercier criticizes Kant for not being sufficiently foundational, since he does not rely on a speculative-metaphysical foundation: “What kind of ethic is it that cannot be theoretically justified?” In our time, the roles are reversed. Many ethicists condemn Kant because he tries to find this foundation! How are we to understand this turn-about in ethics? (shrink)

In celebration of the centennial of the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven, a series of lectures was organized to outline the evolution of various philosophical disciplines in the time span 1889-1989. The lcture on ethics was an attempt to depict the transition from foundational and universalist ethics into a hermeneutical type of ethics that is anti-foundational and particularistic. Such can be interpreted as a transition from modernity into post-modernity,or from ethics into post-ethics : it is the (...) abandonment of the belief that ethics might offer a rational legitimation of ethical principles, or that such principles might be shown to be universal dictates of reason. Several historical and philosophical aspects of this criticism of rationalistic ethics are traced and evaluated, in discussion with authors such as Nussbaum, Rorty, Walzer, and Lévi-Strauss. — 1. The post-modern rehabilitation of moral sensitivity correctly criticizes the poverty of a moral life that is only based on principles. However, it is shown that even loyalty to a particular person or group can only be of an ethical nature ifsome universality is presupposed. — 2. The post-modern rehabilitation of tradition is based on two arguments: moral judging can only occur within a particular way of life, and this particularism is the most efficient anti-dote against totalitarian powers of rationalization and homogenization. Nevertheless, it is evidenced that the universalism of human rights is needed to safeguard such particularism. — 3. Other motives in the criticismof a universalist ethical theory derive from the Wittgensteinian or Heideggerian rejection of humanism as a form of subjectivism or anthropocentrism. The final conclusion is that the particularity of ethos has an important role to playin the development of our moral sense, but that this role is essentially heuristic. Thisparticularity is the experiential matrix for a responsibility that is nevertheless of a universal nature. Ethics can never be equated with the articulation of a particular way of life, or ethos, because it needs the tension between facts and values. Without such atension it is reduced to a positivism of culture. The foundational questions should not be abandoned. They are not rationalistic abstractions precluding experience, but they are the reminders that our norms are norms, i.e. tasks to be fulfilled and not just actualsocial sentiments and preferences. (shrink)

There is a general consensus that the concept of "absolute evil" was coined in order to account for the moral atrocities of the twentieth century. The connotations associated with such a concept are usually threefold: such an evil is not to be understood negatively as a privation of goodness, but as a positive force; such an evil can not be accommodated into any onto-theological order of being, but rather refers to the collapse of such an order; such an evil is (...) diabolical, motivated by the negation of moral law as such, and not by the pursuit of egoistic interests. Moreover, there is a general consensus that Kant's concept of "radical evil" is not radical enough to approximate to this excess of evil, specially since Kant categorically denies the possibility of devilishness. The purpose of this paper is to question this consensus. On the one hand, it is doubtful whether demonic interpretations can provide us with a deeper insight in the moral horrors of the twentieth century. They rather relieve us of our responsibilities, because they withdraw evil from our everyday experiences of weakness. On the other hand, it can be shown that Kant's idea of radical evil, notwithstanding his rejection of the demonic, is much more disturbing than is generally admitted: evil originates in an act of freedom, not in being overwhelmed by desire; the evil of hatred is already prefigurated in the banal evil of indifference; evil is enracinated in a "moral state of nature", where we can only develop our self-respect by continuously comparing ourselves with others, thus initiating ruthless forms of competition. The conclusion proposes to radicalize Kant's notion of evil, not in the direction of a demonic connotation, but in a direction indicated by Levinas: by referring to the experience of the victim. Only confronted with the suffering of others that is caused by me, my moral failure appears to be more than lack or privation: it is inherently excessive, since the victim experiences its own suffering as an intrinsic malignity that can not be accommodated into any order of being. (shrink)

As a consequence of recent discussions on globalization in the last decade, cosmopolitanism has reappeared as an important topic of philosophical debate. The purpose of this article is to explore the possibilities and the limitations of this concept by distinguishing two opposing senses of the term. In one connotation, cosmopolitanism means the tendency to realize a cosmopolis, i.e. a unified and rationalized system of culture, commerce and politics. It implements the ideal of an encompassing logos, as is obvious not only (...) in stoicism, but in recent ideologies of technocratic globalism. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism can mean exactly the opposite: world citizenship as an attitude respectful of diversity and imperfection, and resisting all temptations of uniformity. It is shown that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is based primarily on such a pluralistic view, expressing the conditions under which a plurality of humans can share a public space. On the institutional level, recent ideas on a post-Westphalian world-order, implemented in theories of "cosmopolitan democracy", mesh well with this pluralistic connotation. They imply that citizens escape from the all encompassing and massive sovereignty oftraditional nation-states, not to stumble into an abstract universalism, but to reconfigure sovereignty into a plurality of concrete commitments that are also based on multi-layered trans-national associations of civil society. Potentialities and dangers of such proposals are studied. On the cultural level as well, it can be shown that citizens transcend particular national cultures, not to enter an uprooted global culture, but to enter new forms of concrete cultural environments. (shrink)

Créée par Éric Rochant, Le Bureau des légendes (Canal +, 2015-2020) explore le monde du renseignement en décrivant le travail du service des agents clandestins de la DGSE. Face aux incertitudes et aux complexités géopolitiques du monde contemporain, elle fait le choix d’une immersion au cœur du « renseignement humain ». Cet article envisage l’hypothèse selon laquelle une telle fiction permet de restaurer la confiance des spectateurs vis-à-vis de la capacité d’une démocratie à lutter contre ce qui la menace. En (...) plongeant son spectateur dans les coulisses du renseignement, en le familiarisant avec des personnages complexes, la série questionne la légitimité de la confiance qu’il est possible d’accorder à un service de renseignement. La faillibilité des agents, mise en scène de façon détaillée, réfléchie par la série elle-même, rassure parce qu’elle permet de comprendre et de partager une forme de vie spécifique qui est celle de l’action secrète. L’espionnage, le contre-espionnage et le contre-terrorisme apparaissent alors comme des pratiques reposant en dernier ressort, non pas sur une maîtrise absolue, mais sur la décision de faire confiance ou au contraire de se méfier. Mobilisant les recherches de la sociologie contemporaine à propos de la confiance (Giddens, 1994 et Luhmann 2006), il s’agit de décrire Le Bureau des légendes comme une fiction projetant sur nos écrans, la possibilité d’une restauration de la confiance ou pour le dire à la manière de Stanley Cavell, une issue possible au scepticisme. (shrink)

BackgroundTo prevent sexual boundary violations (SBV) in mental health care institutions overall governments require these institutions to report SBV incidents to a central registry and to develop institutional guidelines how to react. In Europe SBV policies are only recently developed or implemented, as is also the case in Flanders (Belgium). The implementation of a new institutional policy is always a challenge and can encounter resistance, especially when it concerns SBV, because they remain delicate and complex.MethodThis study evaluated the extent to (...) which mandatory policies on SBV have been implemented in mental health care institutions in Flanders, and possible factors for (non-)implementation of these policies. An online survey was sent to the executives of all mental health care institutions in Flanders (N = 162).ResultsIn total 56 executives of mental health care institutions filled out the survey (response rate 35%). Results showed that the implementation of an SBV policy in mental health care institutions is unfortunately inadequate and not all SBV incidents were reported to the central registry. Type of institution and opinions on the SBV policy were related to the (non-)implementation of the requirements.ConclusionsIt is recommended that governments regularly communicate with mental health care institutions to better understand the concerns and difficulties concerning implementation of the required SBV policy and to support/stimulate an organisational culture of more openness and safety on this topic. (shrink)